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Abstract
Background: COVID-19 has challenged the resilience of the health care information system, which has affected our ability to
achieve the global goal of health and well-being. The pandemic has resulted in a number of recent cyberattacks on hospitals,
pharmaceutical companies, the US Department of Health and Human Services, the World Health Organization and its partners,
and others.
Objective: The aim of this review was to identify key cybersecurity challenges, solutions adapted by the health sector, and
areas of improvement needed to counteract the recent increases in cyberattacks (eg, phishing campaigns and ransomware attacks),
which have been used by attackers to exploit vulnerabilities in technology and people introduced through changes to working
practices in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.
Methods: A scoping review was conducted by searching two major scientific databases (PubMed and Scopus) using the search
formula “(covid OR healthcare) AND cybersecurity.” Reports, news articles, and industry white papers were also included if
they were related directly to previously published works, or if they were the only available sources at the time of writing. Only
articles in English published in the last decade were included (ie, 2011-2020) in order to focus on current issues, challenges, and
solutions.
Results: We identified 9 main challenges in cybersecurity, 11 key solutions that health care organizations adapted to address
these challenges, and 4 key areas that need to be strengthened in terms of cybersecurity capacity in the health sector. We also
found that the most prominent and significant methods of cyberattacks that occurred during the pandemic were related to phishing,
ransomware, distributed denial-of-service attacks, and malware.
Conclusions:  This scoping review identified the most impactful methods of cyberattacks that targeted the health sector during
the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as the challenges in cybersecurity, solutions, and areas in need of improvement. We provided
useful insights to the health sector on cybersecurity issues during the COVID-19 pandemic as well as other epidemics or pandemics
that may materialize in the future.
(J Med Internet Res 2021;23(4):e21747) doi: 10.2196/21747
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COVID-19 has been an unprecedented challenge for the global
health care system. It has further challenged the resilience of
the health information system, which has affected our ability
to achieve the global goal of health and well-being. The sector
has become a primary target of adapted cybersecurity attacks
[1,2]. To manage the pandemic and this extraordinary situation,
the health sector has shifted its focus from the security of their
systems and practices to their primary duty of delivering health
care in order to save lives, placing themselves in a vulnerable
situation. Attackers are taking advantage of the COVID-19
pandemic and have launched a number of cyberattacks against
health care organizations [3-8]. Recent cyberattacks have
impacted health care organizations such as Brno University
Hospital [3], the US Department of Health and Human Services
[4], the World Health Organization (WHO) [5], Gilead Sciences,
Inc [6], hospitals in Romania [7], as well as the general supply
chain of the health sector [8]. The health sector must be prepared
to counteract cyberattacks in order to protect the availability of
essential health care services as well as the confidentiality and
integrity of health care information.
Cybercrime adapts to changes in the world situation very
quickly. At the beginning of an escalation in the COVID-19
pandemic, malware cyberattackers identified common
vulnerabilities and adapted their attacks to exploit these
vulnerabilities. The current situation in the United Kingdom
and worldwide provides a fertile breeding ground for various
cyberattacks [9]. Cyberattackers are leveraging the increased
reliance on remote working, decreased mobility, and the closure
of borders between different countries, and the heightened
demand for personal protective equipment (PPE) such as masks
and gloves. The complex health care supply chain is also a target
[10]. As a result, greater fear, uncertainty, and doubt is being
experienced by the general population.
Rationale
There is some research reviewing the literature on cybersecurity
in the health sector. Jalali et al [11] performed a systematic
review of the literature on cybersecurity response plans in health
care. Coventry et al [12] conducted a narrative review on trends
in cyber threats and ways forward in the health sector. Kruse et
al [13] systematically reviewed health care–related cyber threats
and trends. Offner et al [14] reviewed cyber threats and
mitigation strategies among Australian health care organizations.
Sardi et al [15] performed a systematic review of cyber risk in
health facilities. However, there is limited research on an
in-depth review and analysis of key cybersecurity challenges
and solutions, specifically in the health sector, in the context of
a pandemic situation such as COVID-19.
Objective
Through a scoping review, this paper aims to identify the most
prominent and significant methods of attack and threats that
have affected the health sector during the COVID-19 pandemic,
cybersecurity challenges, solutions, and areas that require further
improvement. This research covers not only security-related
matters as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic but also discusses
inherent security challenges in health information systems that
can be potentially exploited by attackers during the COVID-19
pandemic. It has implications for the whole spectrum of the
health sector as a result of the increase in cybersecurity risks
such as phishing, ransomware, and distributed denial-of-service




The review was performed according to the PRISMA-ScR
(Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and
Meta-Analyses Extension for Scoping Reviews) checklist,
proposed by the Joanna Briggs Institute [16]. The aim of this
review is to identify health sector cyberattacks, security
challenges, and solutions. Before undertaking this review, a
protocol was created detailing sources of information, search
strategies, eligibility criteria, source selection, and data charting
processes. The PRISMA-ScR checklist is presented in
Multimedia Appendix 1.
Information Sources
A search of two major scientific databases (PubMed and Scopus)
was performed to identify relevant articles. These include both
original research articles and review articles.
Search
The search formula “(covid OR healthcare) AND cybersecurity”
was used to search for articles. The articles identified should
have either a COVID-cybersecurity core or a
healthcare–cybersecurity core.
Eligibility Criteria
Only articles in English published in the last decade were
included (ie, 2011-2020) in order to focus on current issues,
challenges, and solutions. Reports, news articles, or websites
were also included only when they are related directly to
previously published work, or they were the only currently
available information source at the time of manuscript
preparation. Inclusion criteria were as follows: (1) relevance to
health care cybersecurity and (2) coverage of well-discussed
cybersecurity issues, challenges, and solutions.
Selection of Sources of Evidence
The selection process is illustrated in Figure 1. The results of
the search were exported to the EndNote library. The title and
abstract of each paper were analyzed by 2 of the authors to
assess eligibility. In cases in which this was not obvious, all 4
authors examined the paper and, when necessary, read it to
assess relevance. A total of 307 identified papers were screened
and 53 duplicates were removed. An additional 57 papers were
excluded for not focusing on the healthcare–cybersecurity core
or the COVID-cybersecurity core in the abstract. Another 197
papers were excluded for lacking these cores in the full text. In
total, 56 papers were included in the review.
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Figure 1. Flowchart showing the article identification and selection process.
Data Charting Process
The data were extracted and stored in a standardized Microsoft
Excel (Microsoft Corp) form. This was an iterative process
whereby the charting table is continually updated. Data charting
was carried out both independently and collectively by at least
two authors to ensure the quality of the extracted key findings
from the literature before being used in the analysis.
Data Items
Key data items, including title, abstract, authorship, aims, key
findings related to the review objectives, evidence document,
document type, year of publication, and location, were extracted.
Critical Appraisal Within Sources of Evidence
Although the Joanna Briggs Institute suggests that the critical
appraisal is usually not needed for a scoping review, we had at
least 2 authors check the quality of the source of evidence to
ensure they were relevant, up to date, and from reputable
sources. In cases in which this was not obvious, all 4 authors
assessed the sources.
Synthesis of Results
By aggregating information from the selected literature, the
results were analyzed and qualitatively presented in both tabular
and descriptive formats (grouped into themes), which aligned
with the objective and scope of the review.
Results
Four themes were observed across the selected literature: (1)
health sector condition changes due to COVID-19, (2) health
care cyberattacks during the COVID-19 pandemic, (3) health
care cybersecurity challenges, and (4) health care cybersecurity
controls.
Health Sector Condition Changes Due to COVID-19
The findings pertaining to changes in conditions in the health
sector as a result of COVID-19 are summarized in Table 1. The
main changes to health services caused by the COVID-19
pandemic include decreased mobility, border closures, and the
increasing reliance on remote work, often carried out with little
previous experience and planning. These conditions have made
the health sector more vulnerable to potential cyberattacks
[1,2,17].
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Table 1. Health sector condition changes due to COVID-19.
ReferenceChanges
Hakak et al [1], Williams et al [2], Schneck [17]The decreased mobility and border closures, and the increasing reliance
on remote work, create challenges to health sector
Weil and Murugesan [18]New technologies such as eConsultation services for patients and electronic
multidisciplinary teams leave users open to a variety of attacks
Boddy et al [9], Offner et al [14], Jalali et al [19], Hoffman [20], Ronquillo
et al [21]
Health service staff often have limited experience in working remotely,
leaving the sector vulnerable to cyberattacks, such as malwares
Sardi et al [15], Kim et al [22]The health care industry significantly lags behind other industries in terms
of cybersecurity and digital literacy is lacking among staff working from
home, making it a prominent target
Schneck [17]The increase in demand for certain goods such as PPEa makes health ser-
vices and governments exposed to digital scams such as luring emails with
the intention of stealing sensitive information
aPPE: personal protective equipment.
As health staff and patients are restricted in terms of movement
due to the lockdown, the decrease in mobility and border
closures make individuals and organizations turn to technology
to provide essential health services such as appointments,
diagnosis, and even operations. Examples are the use of
eConsultation (electronic consultation) services for patients and
electronic multidisciplinary teams. Although these technologies
have their advantages, they leave users and receivers of these
technologies open to a variety of attacks such as phishing
campaigns and ransomware attacks [18].
Furthermore, health services staff often have limited previous
experience with remote working and with planning for this
change, which leaves the sector vulnerable to cyberattacks
[9,14,19]. As health services make use of a variety of medical
devices, interconnectivity and interoperability create issues as
they are now being accessed from outside health services’
internal network perimeter. The medium and mode of access
creates problems as access to the sensitive parts of health
services can be reached via unsecured network connections or
unpatched systems by staff working remotely [19]. In addition,
some medical devices use off-the-shelf software, such as
commercial operating systems (eg, older versions of Windows).
These systems are vulnerable to a large variety of threats such
as malware, ransomware, etc [20,21]. Overall, the health care
industry significantly lags behind other industries in terms of
cybersecurity and coupled with a lack of digital literacy among
staff mostly working from home, makes it a prominent target
[15,22].
Additionally, the increase in demand for certain goods such as
PPE and other protective merchandise such as masks, gloves,
etc, are exposing health services and even governments to digital
scams, especially in the form of phishing attacks. As health
services are in need of these essential items, they can be targeted
by adversaries via luring emails with the intention of stealing
sensitive information [17].
Health Care Cyber Attacks During the COVID-19
Pandemic
Multiple cyberattacks occurred at the beginning of the global
COVID-19 pandemic (early 2020) in the health sector. We
selected well-documented cyberattacks with detailed information
available, including root causes and consequences. The main
findings are summarized in Table 2.
Table 2. Security incidents during the COVID-19 pandemic.
ImpactType of attackSecurity incidents
Postponement of surgeries, appointments, etcRansomwareBrno University Hospital [3]
Disruption to COVID-19 pandemic responsesDistributed denial of serviceUS Department of Health and Human Services [4]
Defacement and misinformationRansomware/phishingWorld Health Organization [5]
Impersonation and exfiltrationPhishingGilead Sciences, Inc [6]
Disruption and exfiltrationPhishing/ransomwareHospitals in Romania [7]
Disruption of activitiesMalwareHealth care supply chains [8]
Brno University Hospital in the Czech Republic, which is one
of the country’s main COVID-19 testing centers, was struck by
ransomware, resulting in the postponement of surgeries. The
ransomware infection was confirmed in the early hours of the
day when the hospital decided to disconnect all computer
networks. It was noticed that the ransomware infection was
gradually replicating, and all the individual systems were failing.
As a result, all computers had to be shut down. The hospital is
reported to be still recovering capabilities, as it is not yet fully
operational due to the attack [3]. The attack had an impact on
the activities of the hospital as there was no database systems,
that is, means of storing data; hence, staff have had to write and
transfer their notes manually. This leads to slow processes and
can potentially endanger lives in these trying times.
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The US Department of Health and Human Services experienced
a DDoS attack intended to disrupt the organization’s responses
to the COVID-19 pandemic. This attack targeted its servers by
overloading it with millions of hits over several hours [4]. It
was reported as a campaign of disruption aimed at hindering
the response to the coronavirus pandemic as the targeted agency
was tasked with protecting the health of citizens and delivering
essential human services. Although the agency claimed the
attack was not successful, and that the attackers did not infiltrate
the internal network nor steal any data, this demonstrates that
attacks like these can cause damage not just to the services of
health agencies but also to the lives that depend on it, especially
in times of emergencies.
Increased phishing website hacking attempts on the WHO and
its partners led to the WHO putting out a warning to the general
public to be more careful [5], as it has been reported that over
4000 coronavirus-related domains (ie, domains that contain
words like “corona” or “covid”) have been registered since the
beginning of 2020. These registered domains were used by
adversaries for phishing-related activities. Thus, the WHO
incident was orchestrated by hackers in order to steal passwords.
It was reported that a group of hackers created a malicious
website posing as an email login portal for WHO employees in
an attempt to steal their passwords. Although the WHO claims
the attack was not successful, it still shows that phishing attacks
can be leveraged to target health organizations.
Coronavirus vaccine manufacturer Gilead Sciences, Inc, was
also targeted by hackers [6]. Staff at this pharmaceutical
company were targeted via a fake email login page that was
designed to steal passwords. It was reported that the attack was
an attempt to compromise the email accounts of staff at the
company using messages that impersonated journalists.
Hospitals in Romania experienced ransomware attacks by
hackers as well [7]. The hackers were planning to use
COVID-19–themed emails to infect these hospitals with
ransomware. Their motivation was the protest against the
COVID-19 quarantine measures of the country. The hackers
owned malwares (eg, remote access trojans, ransomware,
website defacements, and SQL injection tools) that can be used
to bring down servers and steal information. It was reported
that they intended to send emails about COVID-19 to hospitals
to infect computers, encrypt files, and disrupt hospital activities.
However, the attack was not as successful as the hackers were
tracked down and arrested by Romanian law enforcement.
It has been reported that Interpol has cautioned agencies around
the world about a significant rise in the global number of
ransomware attacks explicitly targeting hospitals and health
institutions [8]. It discovered that there was an increase in the
number of attempted ransomware attacks on organizations in
the 194 member countries. Additionally, a cyber warning was
issued for key health care organizations involved in the
coronavirus response both in the United Kingdom and the United
States. A joint statement by the United Kingdom’s National
Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) and US Cybersecurity and
Infrastructure Security Agency revealed that malicious cyber
campaigns had been uncovered, with large-scale “password
spraying” campaigns directed at health care bodies and medical
research organizations in both nations [23].
Health care supply chains have not been omitted from these
attacks; the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) issued a
warning about a malware targeting this sector. The malware is
called Kwampirs, a remote access Trojan that exploits network
vulnerabilities of targeted organizations across the United States,
Europe, Asia, and the Middle East [24]. The infected supply
chain components included cyber-physical systems assets in
health care organizations. The FBI alerted the health care sector
against future cyberattacks, as Kwampirs have been historically
targeting health care organizations.
The analysis of the above-mentioned incidents indicate that the
health sector has become a primary target of cybersecurity
attacks. Attackers are taking advantage of the COVID-19
pandemic and launching attacks, which are mainly ransomware,
DDoS, phishing, and other type of malwares. The health care
supply chain can be more vulnerable to cyberattacks especially
during pandemics. The cyberattacks have resulted in negative
impacts on the availability of essential health care services and
challenged health care organizations in the protection of the
confidentiality and integrity of health care information.
Health Care Cybersecurity Challenges
Selected papers discussing the main challenges of cybersecurity
in the health sector were reviewed, and the main findings are
summarized in Table 3.
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Table 3. Key health sector security challenges and associated vulnerabilities.
ReferenceKey challenges and published vulnerabilities
Remote work security assurance
Argaw et al [10]There are known security vulnerabilities with remote desktop protocols and virtual private networks
Offner et al [14]There are known attacks on health care system such as distributed denial-of-service attacks, malware,
etc
Boddy et al [9]Cyberattacks target innumerable wireless connected devices in health care
Endpoint device management
Coventry et al [12]An endpoint device can provide an entry point to larger health care networks
Kruse et al [13], Naidoo [25]The integration of new endpoint devices with outdated, legacy, or unsupported operating systems
compromises interoperability and increases cybersecurity vulnerability
Reagin and Gentry [26]The health sector relies heavily on perimeter defense (antivirus, firewalls) for protection against
cyber risk
Jalali and Kaiser [27]The factor that most influences cybersecurity in a hospital is endpoint complexity
Human factors in cybersecurity
Evans et al [28], Evans et al [29]The majority of information security incidents are related to human error
Jalali et al [19]There is a statistically significant positive correlation between workload and the probability of health
care staff opening a phishing email
Evans et al [28], Evans et al [29]The health sector lacks root cause analysis and cybersecurity incident prevention, especially those
through unintentional human error
Evans et al [30]Although some effort has been made to analyze human error (eg, use of IS-CHECa), such approaches
have not been widely adopted
Lack of security awareness
Gordon et al [31]There is low awareness in the health sector of cyber risks
Furnell and Shah [32]The most common action taken in response to breaches or attacks is additional staff training or
communication
Coventry et al [33]Health staff has poor awareness of consequences of behavior, and there is a lack of policies and re-
inforcement of secure behavior
Kaplan [34]There is a lack of pandemic-specific cybersecurity training campaigns, documented procedures,
and guidance on revised procedures and technologies
Inadequate board-level risk assessment communication
Barad [35]There is a need for a matrix that can translate the strategic requirements of a health care system into
prioritized cyber improvement needs
Tully et al [36]There is a lack of understanding of security risks and its impact on organization-wide risk manage-
ment
Jones and Katzis [37]There is a lack of appreciation among health care executive management of the business risk impact
associated with cyber breaches
Inadequate business continuity plans
Coventry and Branley [12]Risks will continue to grow if cybersecurity is not designed into the product from the beginning of
the product or project life cycle
Frontoni et al [38], Bhatia and Ibrahim [39],
Natsiavas et al [40], Nalin et al [41]
The key security risks challenging business continuity are vendor dependence, inappropriate encryp-
tion configurations, and the inability to handle health information sharing and exchange with third-
party and cross-border partners
Walker-Roberts et al [42]The health sector lacks sophisticated data security tools compared to other industries
Jalali et al [11], Reagin and Gentry [26]Cybersecurity capability is a strategic asset that every health organization must adopt, along with
the concepts of building organizational resilience and the capacity to learn from mistakes
Lack of coordinated incident response
Coventry and Branley [12]The health sector tends to have a time lag between an attack occurring and detection of the breach
Akinsanya et al [43]Current health care cyber defense is often reactive and undertaken after malicious attacks
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ReferenceKey challenges and published vulnerabilities
Chen et al [44]There is a lack of a coordinated incident response capacity to actively counteract constantly
emerging and evolving malware threats
Pullin [45]Cybersecurity should be a team effort, from board members to front-line employees, with all being
held accountable for cybersecurity
Limited budget and the need to deliver health care services without disruption
Argaw et al [46]There is a lack of experienced cybersecurity experts in the health care industry
Boddy et al [9]There is a lack of a value-based system to weigh and balance benefits and risks in aspects of security,
privacy, and adoption of technology
Vulnerable MCPSb
Almohri et al [47]Limited MCPS capability makes the health sector vulnerable to compromises
Zheng et al [48]The reliance on the health care network increases cybersecurity risks to health care systems
Jimenez et al [49]Cyber threats can be introduced to the MCPS though vulnerable IoTc devices
aIS-CHEC: Information Security Core Human Error Causes.
bMCPS: medical cyber-physical systems.
cIoT: internet of things.
The analysis shows that the main cybersecurity challenges of
the health sector are remote work security assurance, endpoint
device management, human errors, the lack of security
awareness, inadequate senior-level security risk assessment,
inadequate business continuity plans, the lack of coordinated
incident response, constrains on budget and resources, and
vulnerability of medical systems. These challenges cover not
only the security-related matters as a result of the COVID-19
pandemic but also the inherent security challenges in the health
sector that can be potentially exploited by attackers during the
COVID-19 pandemic. It is imperative for the health care
organizations to identify these challenges and take actions for
prevention.
Remote Working Security Assurance
As remote working is now an integral element of health care
service delivery, health staff are relying on enterprise remote
desktop protocols and virtual private networks (VPN) to access
internal networks. However, these come with certain risks that
adversaries are looking to exploit. For example, the remote
desktop protocol has a history of security issues and generally
should not be publicly accessible without additional protections
such as firewall, whitelist, and multifactor authentication [10].
Likewise, VPNs also have some known and unknown
vulnerabilities, both on the client and server side, which have
been exploited for years by cybercriminals [19]. The DDoS
attacks on health care systems [14] and the innumerable wireless
connected devices [9] have created further challenges to a
remote work environment.
Endpoint Device Management
A number of endpoint devices, which comprises various
patient-monitoring equipment that either connects to the internet
or legacy-dispersed networks, are often unpatched [12]. This
risk further increased during the pandemic as a result of
organizations competing to procure internet of things (IoT)
devices during the COVID-19 pandemic for their staff, which
resulted in more employees than before using personal devices
to perform work from home. From an enterprise architecture
perspective, having tighter integration across the information
technology (IT) environment is positive in terms of the
organization being more agile; however, it makes the network
vulnerable to cyberattacks such as email phishing, ransomware,
DDoS, and network data breaches [13]. The integration of new
endpoint devices with outdated legacy systems can increase
vulnerabilities [13,25]. However, organizations overly rely on
perimeter defense (antivirus, firewalls) and other forms of basic
protection against cyberattacks [26]. By interviewing 19 C-Suite
cybersecurity professionals, Jalali et al [27] also confirmed the
factor that most influences cybersecurity in a hospital setting
is endpoint complexity.
Human Factors in Cybersecurity
Existing research has shown that the majority of information
security incidents are related to human error [28]. There is a
tendency for human error when staff are busy focusing on saving
lives and adjusting to new work environments and technologies.
With sudden changes in working practices, being under stress
for an extended period of time makes employees vulnerable to
falling into malicious trickery and making mistakes [28].
According to Jalali at al [19], there is a statistically significant
positive correlation between workload and the probability of a
health care staff opening a phishing email. Naidoo et al [25]
developed a multilevel influence model to explore how
cybercriminals exploited the COVID-19 pandemic using social
engineering techniques. However, the health sector lacks root
cause analysis [28] to prevent human error related security
incidents, especially those through unintentional human error
[29]. Although some efforts have been made in applying the
human reliability analysis technique in the context of
information security (eg, Information Security Core Human
Error Causes [IS-CHEC] [30]) to analyze human error, such
approaches have not been widely adopted.
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Lack of Security Awareness
Cybercriminals are exploiting people’s anxieties during the
COVID-19 pandemic. Gordon et al [31] identified that there is
low awareness in the health sector of risks. Furnell et al [32]
identified that the most common action taken in response to the
most disruptive breaches or attacks is additional staff training
or communication. Coventry et al [33] reported that health staff
had poor awareness of the consequences of certain behaviors,
and there is a lack of policies and reinforcement of secure
behavior. However, increased cybersecurity awareness is
required for the health sector to protect themselves and their
patients from potential cyber threats such as phishing and
ransomware. Due to the lack of prior planning and training to
work under pandemic situations, health care staff require more
training and support, such as pandemic-specific cybersecurity
training campaigns, documented procedures, and guidance on
revised procedures and technologies [34]. For example, health
sector staff should be made aware of and able to flag phishing
emails containing buzzwords during a pandemic, such as
“WHO” or “donation.” They should also be advised on how to
validate trustworthy information sources in order to avoid
ransomware attacks [1].
Inadequate Board-Level Risk Assessment
Communication
There is a lack of understanding of security risks and its impact
on organization-wide risk management, such as impacts on
patient care and clinical outcomes [36]. The health sector lacks
a matrix that can translate the strategic improvement needs of
a health care system into prioritized information/cyber
improvement needs [35]. Schwartz et al [37] identified that
there is a lack of appreciation among health care executive
management staff of the business risk impacts of cyber breaches.
Inadequate Business Continuity Plans
The health sector does not have enough data protection
mechanisms; Walker-Roberts et al [42] confirmed that the health
sector lacks sophisticated data security tools compared to other
industries. Security is not built into its supply-chain and
third-party vendors. Existing research shows that the key
security risks challenging business continuity are vendor
dependence, inappropriate encryption configurations, and the
inability to handle health information sharing and exchange
with third-party and cross-border partners [38-41]. Risks will
continue to grow if cybersecurity is not integrated into the
project life cycle from the beginning [12]. Cybersecurity
capability is a strategic asset that every health organization must
adopt, along with the concepts of building organizational
resilience and the capacity to recover from incidents and learn
from mistakes in order to maintain business continuity [11].
Lack of Coordinated Incident Response Involving
Different Parties
As highlighted by Coventry and Branley [12], the health care
sector has a exhibited a trend of having a time lag between the
occurrence of an attack and its detection. In fact, this aids
attackers by giving them more time to explore the network and
conduct lateral movement, which increases the damage inflicted
by security breaches. Current health care cyber defense response
is often reactive and undertaken after malicious attacks [43],
lacking a coordinated incident response capacity to counteract
constantly emerging and evolving malware threats [44]. The
failure of health care organizations in having a successful and
secure backup mechanism in place makes it frail in terms of
incident response and recovery [12]. Pullin et al [45] also
confirmed that cybersecurity should be a team effort, with
everyone from board members to front-line employees being
held accountable for cybersecurity.
Limited Budget and the Need to Deliver Health Care
Services Without Disruption
Although health care services are spending funds to become
more integrated to deliver health care services without disruption
[9], the necessary emphasis is not given to the security aspect
in terms of upkeep (eg, keeping software updated and systems
secure). However, this is reported to be due to a shortage in
experienced cybersecurity experts within health care
organizations with the required skills and experience to enable
health care organizations to change their business operations at
significant pace without undertaking the “usual” levels of
cybersecurity assurance [46]. Boddy et al [9] identified the needs
of a value-based system to weigh and balance the benefits and
risks in aspects of security, privacy, and adoption of technology.
Vulnerable Medical Cyber-Physical Systems
Cybersecurity measures such as vulnerability scans or patch
management are often not available or only possible by
manufacturers [49]. Their basic limited capability makes them
vulnerable to compromise [47]. Cybersecurity measures such
as vulnerability scans or patch management are often not
available or only accessible for manufacturers. Moreover, their
connection and reliance upon the health care network
significantly increase the cybersecurity risk to the entire health
care system [48]. With the widespread use of IoT medical
devices, cyber threats can be introduced to medical
cyber-physical systems though vulnerable IoT devices [44].
Health Care Cybersecurity Controls
Selected papers discussing cybersecurity solutions present within
the health sector were reviewed, and the main findings are
summarized in Table 4.
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Table 4. Crucial health sector security solutions.
ReferenceSolution
Apply endpoint device management tools
Reagin and Gentry [26]Apply perimeter-based defense (antivirus, firewalls) for protection against cyberattacks
Hoffman [20]Restrict the technologies and devices used by health staff to remain compliant with security regulations
such as HIPAAa during pandemics
Kelly et al [50]Adapt the NISTb approach to manage security IoTc medical devices
Secure the remote work environment
Argaw et al [10]Apply multifactor authentication
Deebak et al [51]Apply a chaotic map–based authenticated security framework for remote point of care
Zorz [52]Apply remote access monitoring such as the NHSd attack surface reduction rules
NHS Digital [53]Apply perimeter security solution such as NHS Secure Boundary to enable secure access
Rezaeibagha et al [54]The health care sector needs to ensure data protection mechanisms for securing system access and transmitting
data
Raise security awareness
Pullin [45], Sedlack [55]Apply a holistic, integrated approach to improve staff awareness, competence, and mitigation of threats
Gordon et al [56]Implement cybersecurity training programs and cybersecurity awareness campaigns
NHS Digital [57]Apply the NCSC’se Board Toolkit to raise board-level security awareness
Alzahrani [58]Provide comprehensive employee training and education to enable the identification and assessment of
risks
Kessler et al [59]Implement a positive organizational climate to influence people’s behavior
Ensure business continuity
NHS Digital [60]Apply a self-assessment tool such as the NHS Data Security and Protection Toolkit
Dameff et al [61]Embrace cybersecurity and a develop strong culture of cyber vigilance
Rezaeibagha et al [54]Ensure business continuity through data backups, intrusion detection, and prevention systems
Kim et al [22]Apply a systematic risk assessment of the impacts on health care business operations
Kabir et al [62]Consider cybersecurity insurance in health care
Apply technical controls
Hakak et al [1]Apply network segmentation to isolate network traffic
Yaseen et al [63]Apply general technical controls including encryption, authentication, and authorization
Raisaro et al [64]Apply homomorphic encryption that ensures strong security and privacy guarantees while enabling analysis
of encrypted data and sensitive medical information
Narikimilli et al [65]Apply blockchain to facilitate health care interoperability
Pussewalage and Oleshchuk [66]Apply cryptographic security to address data sharing and storage of patient information across network
systems
Policies and legislations
Raisaro et al [64]Laws and regulations can help to combat the issues of medical cyber-physical systems
Wang and Jones [67]Security instructions and control designs should be tailored
Department of Health and Social
Care, UK Government [68]
Regulatory changes or manufacturers should become more security-minded in the medical device design
phase
Bhuyan et al [69]Policymakers may need to alter policies to allow new technological innovations to be applied to health care
Hoffman [20]The US Congress passed the 21st Century Cures Act to promote patient control over their own health infor-
mation while protecting privacy and cybersecurity
Incident reporting and cyber threat intelligence support
Department of Health and Social
Care, UK Government [68]
NHS Digital issued two high-severity CareCERT alerts (BlueKeep and DejaBlue) and developed a high-
severity alert process handbook to facilitate incident reporting and sharing
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He and Johnson [70], He and John-
son [71]
Apply an evidence-based approach, such as the generic security template, for incident reporting and exchange
Hakak et al [1]Establish an international workforce to facilitate cyber threat reporting and exchange to combat pandemic-
themed cyber threats
Cybersecurity guidance specific to COVID-19
NHS Digital [72]The NHS has added guidance on working from home securely in the context of COVID-19
Information Commissioner’s Office
[73]
The United Kingdom’s Information Commissioner’s Office created an information hub to assist individuals
and organizations to manage data protection during the COVID-19 pandemic
aHIPAA: Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act.
bNIST: National Institute of Standards and Technology.
cIoT: internet of things.
dNHS: National Health Service.
eNCSC: National Cyber Security Centre.
Apply Endpoint Device Protection
During the COVID-19 pandemic, health staff working from
home may adopt telehealth technologies or IoT devices. This
increases cybersecurity risks, as it expands the footprint for
cyberattack to the use of new devices outside of the service
providers’ network [50]. Health staff are advised to restrict the
technologies and devices they used to remain compliant with
security regulations such as Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act during the pandemics [20]. However, health
care organizations mainly reply on perimeter defense (eg,
antivirus, firewalls) for protection against the potential
cyberattacks [26]. The National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) has recently released a draft security guide
and recommendations for managing the security IoT devices,
but it is unclear whether it will be enforced across the health
sector [50].
Secure Remote Work Environment
Existing solutions include the use of multifactor authentication
and the monitoring of the log activity of user accounts and
revoking account access if no longer needed [10]. Deebak et al
[51] proposed a chaotic map–based authenticated security
framework for remote point of care. Health organizations such
as those in the United Kingdom have started using services to
monitor their remote access infrastructure constantly and to
investigate anomalies. For example, the National Health Service
(NHS) has employed attack surface reduction rules (eg, block
macros, executable content, process creation) [52]. Furthermore,
a more recent NHS Digital service, Secure Boundary, was
introduced as a perimeter security solution to enable secure
access for NHS staff and to provide security monitoring [53].
Raise Security Awareness
Health care organizations already have cybersecurity programs
in place to increase levels of security awareness [45,55]. Existing
solutions include the use of cybersecurity training programs
and cybersecurity awareness campaigns [56]. In a cybersecurity
campaign, the IT department sends out fake phishing emails to
their staff and provides further training to those who fail to
identify these emails [56]. In the United Kingdom, more than
100 NHS boards have completed cybersecurity training
accredited by the Government Communications Headquarters
since the WannaCry attack. Furthermore, the NCSC’s Board
Toolkit for the NHS provides additional information on
ransomware and backups. NHS Digital also runs a cyber
awareness campaign called the Keep I.T. Confidential campaign.
Over 340 organizations have downloaded the materials since
its launch in September 2019 [57]. However, there is not enough
work on training programs tailored to the pandemic such as
COVID-19–themed social engineering, although the world is
realizing the importance of raising the awareness of
COVID-19–related cyberattacks [58]. Existing research shows
that positive organizational climate can influence people’s
behavior [59].
Ensure Business Continuity
Health care leadership must embrace cybersecurity and develop
strong cultures of cybervigilance [61]. The health sector already
has business continuity solutions in place such as data backups
and intrusion detection and prevention systems [54]. NHS trusts
have been asked to follow and meet the Cyber Essentials and
government standards. NHS Digital has launched a Data
Security and Protection Toolkit [60], a self-assessment tool for
organizations that need to access NHS patient information and
systems. The toolkit must be applied to ensure that organizations
practice good cyber hygiene. Security risk assessment is
essential to ensure business continuity. Kim et al [22]
systematically assessed the impacts of cybersecurity threats on
remote health care. Cybersecurity insurance in health care [62]
should also be considered as a solution to ensure business
continuity management, but it has not been widely adopted.
Apply Technical Controls
General technical controls applied by the health sector include
encryption, authentication, and authorization to protect data
from cyber threats [63]. Cryptographic security is used to
address data sharing and storage of patient information across
network systems [66]. Homomorphic encryption is applied to
ensure robust security and privacy guarantees while enabling
analysis of encrypted data and sensitive medical information
[64]. Blockchain is also applied to facilitate health care
interoperability due to its immutability, transparency, and
decentralization [65]. Network segmentation and isolation also
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need to be considered by the health sector [1]. With network
segmentation, network traffic can be isolated and/or filtered to
limit and/or prevent access between network zones. For
example, in case of systems compromise, one should freeze any
activity in the system, disconnect the infected machines from
any external drive or medical device, and go offline from the
network.
Policy and Legislation
The health sector already has security policies and legislation
in place for cybersecurity management. Laws and regulations
are available to protect medical cyber-physical systems [64].
Security controls need to be tailored according to regulation
[67]. Manufacturers are also required to consider these
regulations to design medical devices [68]. However,
policymakers may need to alter policies to allow new
technological innovations to be applied to health care [69]. The
US Congress passed the 21st Century Cures Act to promote the
interoperability of electronic health records and promote more
patient control over one’s own health information while
protecting privacy and cybersecurity [20]. However, more efforts
are needed on security policies or legislations in handling
cybersecurity-related matters during pandemics like COVID-19.
Incident Reporting and Cyber Threat Intelligence
Support
The health sector is required to report cybersecurity incidents
to a supervisory authority, such as the national Computer
Security Incident Response Team in the European Union. In
the United Kingdom, there is government-approved support
from the NCSC. NHS Digital has issued two high-severity
CareCERT alerts in 2019 (BlueKeep and DejaBlue). After
developing a high-severity alert process handbook, remediation
went from 18 weeks for BlueKeep down to 3 weeks for
DejaBlue [68]. He and Johnson [70,71] proposed a generic
security template, which is an evidence-based argumentation
approach to facilitate incident reporting and exchange. This
approach was applied to a health care organization but has not
been widely adopted. Hakak et al [1] identified the needs of
establishing an international workforce to facilitate threat
reporting and cyber threat intelligence (eg, attack vectors and
countermeasures) exchange to combat pandemic-themed cyber
threats. The health sector will benefit from such practices during
pandemics in order to avoid similar incidents.
Cybersecurity Guidance Specific to COVID-19
Some health care organizations have started providing security
guidance specific to COVID-19 for their staff. For example,
NHS Digital has added guidance on working from home
security, ramping up its on-site support for trusts on risk
mitigations, data backup, and threat response. They also offer
the NHS the NCSC’s Protective Domain Name Service free of
charge [72]. Furthermore, governments also provide
cybersecurity guidance to both individuals and organizations.
For example, the United Kingdom’s Information
Commissioner’s Office created an information hub in order to




Through a scoping review, this research identified key
cybersecurity challenges, solutions adapted by the health sector,
and areas to be improved in order to counteract the cyberattacks
introduced through changes to working practices in the face of
the COVID-19 pandemic. This review identified 9 main
challenges in cybersecurity and 11 key solutions that health
care organizations adapted to address these challenges. Based
on our findings and analysis, we can conclude that the main
challenges that the health sector faces due to the COVID-19
pandemic include increased reliance on remote working by staff,
high demand for PPE by staff on the first line of defense, and
decreased mobility due to the lockdown. Indeed, these changes
have made the health sector vulnerable to potential cyberattacks.
For example, remote work was taken up by users with little
previous experience, and there was also no planning and
cybersecurity-associated assurance prior to the shift.
Furthermore, evidence can be seen from the security incidents
that took place during the lockdown period such as those of
Brno University Hospital, hospitals in Romania, etc. The health
sector continues to face security challenges [1,17]. Challenges
such as remote working security assurance, endpoint device
management, inadequate business continuity plans, lack of
security awareness, etc, are apparent in the health sector. There
are some existing solutions employed by health care
organizations, especially in the United Kingdom, such as remote
access monitoring. Figure 2 summarizes the main findings from
the literature review and highlights the gaps and vulnerabilities
that were exploited during the cyberattacks that took place
during the COVID-19 pandemic. However, there are still
challenges and gaps to be addressed, as discussed below.
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Figure 2. Security attacks, key security challenges, solutions, and areas to improve. FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigation; VPN: virtual private network.
Implications for Future Research
Although the health sector has made some efforts to address
these challenges, more research is required in some domains.
Technical Controls
The health sector has applied some technical solutions to tackle
cybersecurity challenges in order to secure the remote work
environment and monitor endpoint applications. These include
but are not limited to network security (eg, network
segmentation), multifactor authentication, password protection,
patching systems, and the use of intrusion detection and
prevention systems. There are also innovative security solutions
such as the zero-trust principle (ie, to treat all devices as
untrustworthy before access or authorization can be considered).
The use of VPNs is a popular technique in the remote work
environment but is not always required. Health care
organizations should avoid the abuse of VPNs and ensure it is
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applied to specific tasks, such as for system admin use and
medical diagnosis purposes through access to legacy systems
(eg, patient records management systems) stored on private data
servers. Future research should explore innovative solutions
such as blockchain as it can facilitate health care interoperability
due to its immutability, transparency, and decentralization. In
general, the health sector significantly lags behind other sectors
in terms of cybersecurity. Future research should borrow
experience from general cybersecurity practices (eg, NIST
guidelines) and adapt them according to the needs of the health
sector, especially in the context of pandemics.
Cyber Resilience
In order to improve system resilience, health organizations have
some business continuity planning in place for data protection
and recovery but lack a systematic way to maintain cyber
resilience [18]. The vulnerabilities in the cyber supply chain
makes it difficult to recover from an incident caused by third
parties [38-41]. In the case of impact on medical devices or
clinical information systems, incident response should be
coordinated with device manufacturers and vendors. Health
care organizations have realized the importance of having a
comprehensive view of cybersecurity management in order to
prevent cyberattacks [18] but have not built this coordinated
capacity. There is a lack of a cyber resilience program to
evaluate vendors’ capabilities around threat protection,
particularly across email servers (phishing and ransomware),
breadth of portfolio coverage in addressing cloud architecture,
and endpoint security. Future research should focus on building
a coordinated cybersecurity capacity in order to systematically
assess vulnerabilities and respond to cyber threats.
Human Factors in Cybersecurity
People are likely to make mistakes, especially in the context of
changes in their traditional way of working. Health care
organizations are required to adopt a nonblaming culture in
reporting incidents. The health sector should focus on root cause
analysis [28] and prevent incidents from happening especially
through unintentional human error. Published research has
shown that the majority of information security incidents relate
to human error [28,29], which is a vulnerability that attackers
will look to exploit. A human error analytical approach such as
IS-CHEC could be deployed both reactively, through integration
within incident management practices [29,30], and proactively,
through simple interaction with operational personnel [29], to
detect current human error areas of weaknesses and apply
associated remedial and preventative measures. Moreover, health
care staff in the organization need to be educated and build
awareness of the ongoing security situation during the
COVID-19 pandemic. For example, in the case of infection,
staff are required to disconnect from the network to contain the
spread. Organizations should continuously raise awareness
internally by launching campaigns even during a time of crisis
(ie, to inform health staff not to open suspicious emails). Future
research should focus on creating pandemic-themed security
awareness campaigns. Moreover, a positive and empowering
culture is also required (eg, by sharing the rate of people who
did not click on phishing-negative emails during a training
campaign). Experience can be borrowed from the organizational
climate literature to positively influence people’s behavior [59].
Strategic Cybersecurity Management
Although health care organizations have invested in
cybersecurity to counteraction security attacks, further efforts
are needed to reprioritize cybersecurity risk assessment during
the COVID-19 pandemic, reallocate security investment, and
optimize resource utilization to obtain adequate assurances.
According to Argwa et al [46], health care organizations are
advised to allocate more resources and funding to cybersecurity.
Strategic cybersecurity investment is still an immature research
area in health care largely due to boards’ inability to fully
understand and anticipate the direct and indirect impact on their
health services. Further, there are language barriers between
the technical team and the board [27]. Another reason is that
the board finds it difficult to estimate the costs of investing and
balancing these against potential benefits procured or impacts
mitigated [8] as cybersecurity investments prevent potential
losses but may not generate business benefits directly. Moreover,
organizations should not only create security guidelines specific
to the COVID-19 pandemic but also plan for the long term for
remote working and spend efforts on strengthening their security
mechanisms and cybersecurity crisis management capabilities.
More research efforts are needed to support the top management
teams of the health sector to understand the threat landscape
and make better-informed decisions to allocate resources not
just to provide services to staff and patients but also for
protection and resilience, in order to continuously serve even
in times of emergency such as the current pandemic and beyond.
Limitations
Contrary to systematic reviews, scoping reviews are used to
identify knowledge gaps, scope a body of literature, and clarify
concepts. However, some limitations should be considered.
Scoping reviews usually provide descriptive information in
order to address the objectives of the review, which often leads
to less defined searches. This review mitigated this limitation
by clearly defining the search terms and search formula. Scoping
reviews are also at risk of bias from different sources. All 4
authors were involved in the article identification, selection,
and analysis processes in order to reduce the risks of bias.
Because of variability when conducting a scoping review, there
is a need for methodological standardization to ensure the
strength of evidence. This review followed the PRISMA-ScR
to standardize the process and improve the strength of evidence.
Another limitation is that this review included exact terms used
to search the titles or abstracts of existing publications. Any
articles that used different terms, (eg, “computer security”)
would not have been included. In addition, publications that
were not written in English were excluded. Moreover, although
this scoping review focused on health care, the solutions
identified could be applied to other industries.
Conclusions
The COVID-19 pandemic has challenged the resilience of the
health care information system. This research was motivated
by the urgency of counteracting the cyberattacks that have
recently happened to hospitals, pharmaceutical companies, the
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US Department of Health and Human Services, and the WHO
and its partners, etc. We performed a review on security
challenges of the health sector and the solutions employed
during COVID-19. We identified the root causes of the security
incidents that have impacted the health sector during the
COVID-19 pandemic, cybersecurity challenges, solutions, and
areas in need of improvement. The results show that the main
root causes of the security incidents that happened during the
COVID-19 pandemic are mainly from phishing, ransomware,
DDoS attacks, and malware. The main challenges faced by
health care organizations are inadequate endpoint device
management, lack of security awareness, insecure remote work
environment, inadequate business continuity plans, lack of
coordinated incident response, and difficulty in trading off
security investment and service delivery quality. Needless to
say, another major challenge is human error, both from the
perspective of the health care worker at the frontline and those
working from home. As the COVID-19 pandemic has shifted
our priorities, there is a greater tendency for human error to
occur when staff are preoccupied with saving lives, working in
a strange or different environment, and using new or various
technologies. With little or no experience and a lack of prior
planning and training to work in such situations, health care
workers require more than training and support, such as adequate
time, documented procedures, and guidance on revised
procedures and technology.
Although the health sector has made some efforts to address
these challenges by applying technical measures, raising security
awareness, enforcing policies, and developing
COVID-19–specific guidelines, more research efforts are still
required in some domains. Future research should focus on
exploring enhanced technical controls through the adaption of
general cybersecurity practices (eg, NIST guidelines); improving
cyber resilience by building a coordinated cybersecurity capacity
to systematically assess vulnerabilities of the complex health
care supply chain and respond to cyber threats; reducing
human-related security incidents by exploring human error
reduction approaches and pandemic-themed awareness
campaigns; and enhancing strategic cybersecurity management
by exploring crisis management planning, security risks
reprioritization, and the optimization of cybersecurity budget
and resource reallocation.
Many health care organizations are applying a temporary
solution to counteract cyber threats during the COVID-19
pandemic. These organizations should plan for the long term,
provide adequate levels of cybersecurity resources to deal with
fast-changing situations, and offer the required assurance within
these changes. This paper provides useful insights for the health
sector on their cybersecurity issues during the COVID-19
pandemic or other epidemic or pandemic situations in the future.
Moreover, cybersecurity experience in other sectors can be
borrowed and applied in the health sector.
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